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OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
This case involves principally the interpretation of a
construction subcontract. A dispute arose when a general
contractor,
Shoemaker
Construction
Company
(“Shoemaker”), failed to pay a subcontractor, Sloan &
Company (“Sloan”), the remaining balance on its subcontract.
The appellant in this case, Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company (“Liberty Mutual”), is the surety on the subcontract
and the party Sloan has sued for payment on the surety bond.
Sloan cross-appeals with respect to one aspect of its claim.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion as to Liberty
Mutual’s appeal, and affirm the ruling on Sloan’s crossappeal.
I. Background
Isla of Capri Associates LP (“IOC”) owned and
developed waterfront condominiums in Philadelphia.
Shoemaker contracted with IOC to build the project (the
“prime contract”).
Shoemaker then lined up various
subcontractors that included Sloan, who agreed to perform
drywall and carpentry work on the project (the
“subcontract”). Payment for the subcontractors’ work was
insured by a surety bond issued by Liberty Mutual. At the
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project’s completion, IOC refused to pay Shoemaker nearly
$6.5 million owed under the prime contract. Of that amount,
$5 million was due the subcontractors. IOC claimed it was
withholding money for several reasons, one of which was that
some of the subcontractors’ work was untimely and
deficient. 1 Shoemaker then refused to pay Sloan the full
amount of the remaining balance Sloan claimed was due
under their subcontract—$1,074,260.
In May 2007, Shoemaker sued IOC to recover the
balance on the prime contract. Sloan then made a claim
against Liberty Mutual for payment on the surety bond. Five
weeks later, Liberty Mutual denied the claim in its entirety,
reserving all rights and defenses. As a ground for denying
any payment obligation to Sloan, Liberty Mutual asserted that
one of the subcontract’s terms, found in Paragraph 6.f,
conditioned Sloan’s right to payment on Shoemaker’s receipt
of payment from IOC. Relying on that interpretation of the
subcontract, Liberty Mutual claimed that Sloan was not
entitled to payment from Shoemaker because IOC had not
paid Shoemaker.
In December 2007, Sloan filed a complaint against
Liberty Mutual in the District Court. Sloan moved for
summary judgment in the amount of $1,074,260.09, plus
interest and taxable costs. Liberty Mutual cross-motioned for
summary judgment. It argued that even if Sloan were entitled
to payment, the amount at most was $785,067 because of

1

IOC deducted $418,392 from Sloan’s claim for payment
because it identified Sloan as one of the subcontractors who
were “bad actors.” A1018.
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various offsets. Sloan’s claim, and Liberty Mutual’s alleged
offsets, broke down as follows:
Sloan’s
Claim

Liberty
Undisputed
Mutual’s
Amount in
Alleged Offsets Controversy

$1,074,260
Legal fees
(attributable to
Sloan)

$16,579 2

Repairs

$40,370

Deficiencies

$24,600

Time &
Materials
Provided

$66,324

Lump Sum
Proposals
Performed

$141,320

Subtotal of
offsets claimed

$289, 193

$785,067

2

In its second cross-motion for summary judgment, Liberty
Mutual claimed that this amount was much higher.
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Meanwhile, Shoemaker’s lawsuit against IOC hit a
dead end. Shoemaker learned that IOC’s financial situation
made it unable to satisfy a judgment for the entire claim even
if one were awarded to Shoemaker. It entered into a
settlement agreement with IOC for $1 million, apparently all
that IOC was able to pay. 3
Shoemaker offered its
subcontractors their pro rata share of amounts owed in
exchange for a release of claims, but Sloan did not agree to
that arrangement and continued to press its suit against
Liberty Mutual. 4
In August 2009, the District Court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Sloan for $785,067 (the “First
Judgment”). It rejected Liberty Mutual’s interpretation of the
subcontract as conditioning Sloan’s right to payment on
IOC’s payment to Shoemaker. The Court allowed the parties
to conduct additional discovery as to whether Sloan was
entitled to any additional amounts.
3

Liberty Mutual represented that Shoemaker had spent over
$3 million pursuing payment from IOC and, at the time of
oral argument, IOC had paid only $300,000 of the agreed
settlement.

4

Prior to this, Liberty Mutual had moved for a dismissal or
stay of Sloan’s suit based on a provision of the subcontract in
which Sloan “agree[d] to [wait to] pursue its claim against the
Contractor or its surety until the Contractor Dispute
Resolution and all appeals thereto are completed and become
final.” On information that Shoemaker’s case was settled,
Sloan moved to lift the stay and for entry of summary
judgment.
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After discovery, the parties again moved for summary
judgment. The Court granted partial summary judgment in
favor of Sloan on the issue of legal fees and deficiencies, and
awarded prejudgment interest (on that amount as well as on
the previous sum awarded—$785,067), for an additional sum
aggregating $145,895 (the “Second Judgment”). 5
In lieu of trial on the remaining amounts, the parties
stipulated to the entry of a third and final judgment in favor of
Sloan on February 12, 2010 (the “Final Judgment”). Included
within the Final Judgment were sums set forth in the First
Judgment, the Second Judgment, and the additional amount
of
$179,876 ($156,224, plus prejudgment interest of
$23,652). 6 The combined amounts in the Final Judgment
(excluding interest) were $91,790 less than Sloan’s initial
claim of $1,074,260.
The parties agreed to preserve their rights to appeal all
three of the District Court’s judgments, and Liberty Mutual
does so, challenging the District Court’s interpretation of the
subcontract. It argues that Shoemaker’s obligation to pay
5

The principal amount of this judgment was $41,179.
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The Final Judgment dealt with the remaining amounts in
dispute. Per the parties’ stipulation, that judgment deducted
nothing for repairs, $11,430 for time and materials provided,
and $80,361 for lump sum proposals performed. We take
from the parties’ briefs that only the propriety of these
deductions is challenged, but not their amounts. Therefore,
we address only whether Liberty Mutual was entitled to argue
for these deductions.

7

Sloan was conditioned on its receipt of payment from IOC,
or, put another way, Sloan was entitled to be paid only
whatever amount Shoemaker received from IOC for Sloan’s
work. Liberty Mutual also contests the District Court’s
determination on litigation costs. It argues it is entitled to
deduct Sloan’s share of the legal fees stemming from
Shoemaker’s suit against IOC.
In addition, Sloan crossappeals the $91,790 shortfall from its initial claim. It argues
that Liberty Mutual waived the right to claim offsets by
failing to state their bases within 45 days of Sloan’s initial
claim. 7
II. Discussion
Summary judgment is in order when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Our review over the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment is plenary. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d
299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). We also exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s interpretation of state law. Emerson
Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., 253 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir.
2001).
A.

The Contract

The crux of the dispute is Paragraph 6.f of the
subcontract, which deals with final payment. Thus, to resolve
7

The District Court had jurisdiction based on the diversity of
the parties’ citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction over the District Court’s rulings under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
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the dispute, we begin by considering in detail the language
and structure of that provision.
It contains two subparagraphs. The first provides in
relevant part: “Final payment shall be made within thirty (30)
days after the last of the following to occur, the occurrence of
all of which shall be conditions precedent to such final
payment . . . .” That subparagraph then lists those conditions
precedent (seven in all), one of which (condition three) is that
“[IOC] shall have accepted the Work and made final payment
thereunder to [Shoemaker]” (emphasis added). Another
(condition six) is that “[Shoemaker] shall have received final
payment from [IOC] for [Sloan’s] Work” (emphasis added).
Liberty Mutual argues that these conditions constitute
a “pay-if-paid” clause. In construction contract parlance, this
means that a subcontractor gets paid by the general contractor
only if the owner pays the general contractor for that
subcontractor’s work. Pennsylvania courts follow suit, and
construe clauses that condition payment to the subcontractor
on the general contractor’s receipt of payment from the owner
as pay-if-paid clauses. 8 See, e.g., C.M. Eichenlaub Co., Inc.
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 437 A.2d 965, 967 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981); Cumberland Bridge Co. v. Lastooka, 8 Pa. D. & C.3d
475, 482 (C.P. Washington 1977).
Sloan, on the other hand, argues that the first
subparagraph of 6.f does not establish a condition precedent
to Sloan’s payment, but rather is a “pay-when-paid” clause.
On the surface, these terms seem much the same (save,
perhaps, that paying if paid does not tell us when that
8

It is undisputed that Pennsylvania law applies.
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payment is due). But in industry jargon, they are different. In
contrast to a pay-if-paid clause, a pay-when-paid clause does
not establish a condition precedent, but merely creates a
timing mechanism for the general contractor’s payment to the
subcontractor. See, e.g., United Plate Glass Co. Div. of
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Metal Trims Indus., Inc., 525 A.2d
468, 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
To support its pay-when-paid interpretation, Sloan
points to the second subparagraph of 6.f, which describes a
process by which it may sue Shoemaker for final payment in
the event that IOC fails to make final payment to Shoemaker.
The language of that subparagraph states:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this
Paragraph 6.f, if within six months of the date
that final payment is due to [Shoemaker by
IOC], [Sloan] has not received final payment
for its Work, [Sloan] may pursue its claim
against [Shoemaker] and its Surety [Liberty
Mutual] for final payment as follows:
If within six months of the date that final
payment is due and payable to [Shoemaker],
[Shoemaker] commences a legal proceedings
against [IOC] . . . (the “Contractor Dispute
Resolution”) to resolve its own claim for final
payment, [Sloan] agrees not to pursue its claim
against [Shoemaker] or [Liberty Mutual] until
the Contractor Dispute Resolution and all
appeals thereto are completed and become final
....
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Upon completion of the Contractor Dispute
Resolution . . . , [Sloan] may pursue any
remaining claim for final payment it may have
against [Shoemaker] or its Surety.
Notably, that subparagraph concludes by stating that
[n]othing in Paragraph 6.f is intended to modify
the provisions of Paragraph 20[, which deals
with dispute resolution,] under the Subcontract .
...
We consider each subparagraph in turn and their combined
effect on the meaning of the contract.
Pennsylvania follows the plain meaning rule of
contract interpretation, such that “[w]hen a written contract is
clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its
contents alone. It speaks for itself and a meaning cannot be
given to it other than that expressed.” Steuart v. McChesney,
444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Accordingly, the cases recognize that
express language of condition is sufficient to establish a payif-paid condition precedent. In C.M. Eichenlaub Co., for
example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court viewed as a
condition precedent to payment a clause that stated the
builder “shall be under no obligation to make any payments
to contractor . . . for materials delivered or for work
performed by contractor unless and until Builder is first paid
for such materials and work by the owner.” 437 A.2d at 967;
see also Cumberland Bridge Co., 8 Pa. D. & C. 3d at 479-80
(same). When certainty is lacking, however, Pennsylvania
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courts tend to interpret payment provisions as pay-when-paid
clauses. See, e.g., United Plate Glass Co., 525 A.2d at 470.
But that is not our case. The first subparagraph of 6.f
states unequivocally that IOC’s payment to Shoemaker is a
condition precedent to Shoemaker’s obligation to pay Sloan.
We do not imagine that the parties intended otherwise merely
because they did not use additional language to underscore
their intent to create a pay-if-paid clause, as Sloan argues. To
mandate redundant provisions conjures the consequence that
only repetition makes a provision pay-if-paid. Moreover, we
agree that courts should not interpret contracts in a way that
“render[s] at least one clause superfluous or meaningless.”
Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir.
1988). Thus, we are satisfied that the parties’ chosen
language is sufficient to create a pay-if-paid clause in the first
subparagraph of 6.f.
The opposite conclusion would lead to bizarre results.
If Sloan failed to complete its work, per condition one, could
it then argue that it was still entitled to final payment under
the subcontract? We can see no principled reason to treat
differently conditions three and six (no payment to Sloan until
Shoemaker has received “final” payment from IOC). That
seven conditions were enumerated in this provision, and
expressly delineated conditions precedents, weigh in favor of
a pay-if-paid construction. In the face of this plain language,
we shall not infer a contrary intent. 9

9

A leading construction law treatise suggests that there is
nothing inherently unfair about a pay-if-paid clause that
operates to shift risk of non-payment by the owner to the
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However, that is not the end of the story. The parties
created an override provision in the second subparagraph of
6.f that modifies the pay-if-paid clause of the first
subparagraph. Specifically, the language of the second
subparagraph, noted above, demonstrates that the contracting
parties intended Sloan to have a “claim” against Shoemaker
for “any remaining final payment” in certain instances—
specifically, in the event that IOC failed to make final
payment (defined as the entire unpaid balance on the prime
contract) within six months.
A modification of a pay-if-paid condition is a not
uncommon practice in the construction industry. See The
subcontractor. This interpretation is favored where there is
“clear and unequivocal language set forth unambiguously on
the face of the contract.” For example, “the subcontractor
should not be entitled to payment if a payment clause
specifically states that (1) payment to the contractor is a
condition precedent to payment to the subcontractor; or (2)
the subcontractor is to bear the risk of the owner’s
insolvency; or (3) the subcontractor is to be paid exclusively
out of a fund the sole source of which is the owner's payment
to the subcontractor.” 2-7 Construction Law P 7.04 (Matthew
Bender ed., 2011). In our case, the first factor is clearly met.
Arguably, the third factor is also met given that the third
condition precedent in the first subparagraph of 6.f requires
that “Owner [IOC] shall have accepted the Work and made
final payment thereunder to Contractor [Shoemaker].” By
implication, the money used to make final payment to the
subcontractor comes directly from the final payment made to
the contractor.

13

Construction Contracts Book 160-63 (Daniel S. Brennan et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2008). There are several ways to modify payif-paid clauses. Particularly “[i]n states that distinguish
between the two [i.e., pay-if-paid and pay-when-paid
provisions], an obvious way to modify a pay-if-paid clause is
to convert it to a pay-when-paid clause. This is accomplished
by eliminating the condition precedent after a contractually
stated period of time.” Id. at 162. Though we do not know
for certain, we can imagine several reasons why the parties
here—both sophisticated players—might have contracted for
such a modification. For one, “pragmatic contractor[s]”
understand subcontractors’ reluctance to agree to an absolute
pay-if-paid clause and are thus sometimes amenable to some
form of modification or ‘softening’ of the condition
precedent. See id. at 160. Alternatively, Shoemaker may
have anticipated that Sloan would sue for payment if IOC
defaulted, notwithstanding the pay-if-paid clause. The second
part of Paragraph 6.f is a way to control the timing and extent
of Sloan’s legal action in that scenario.
In any event, the pay-if-paid condition, as modified,
yields after six months of IOC non-payment and is replaced
with a timing mechanism that specifies when and for how
much Sloan may sue Shoemaker. Specifically, that timing
mechanism allows Sloan to “pursue any remaining claim for
final payment.” It requires Sloan to wait to “pursue” its
“claim” until Shoemaker has had an opportunity to recover
what it can from IOC. Accordingly, because IOC has failed
to pay for over six months and Shoemaker’s suit against IOC
for payment has concluded, Sloan is entitled to “pursue any
remaining claim for final payment.”
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That conclusion leads to another issue: how to define
“any remaining claim for final payment.” The structure of
Paragraph 6.f demonstrates that the parties did not intend for
Sloan’s “remaining claim for final payment” to equal the
entire unpaid balance on the subcontract. Such a construction
would essentially nullify the first subparagraph: whether IOC
made, and Shoemaker received, final payment on the prime
contract would be irrelevant if, in cases of IOC non-payment,
Sloan was always entitled to the entire unpaid balance on the
subcontract.
To understand what the parties intended by the phrase
“remaining claim for final payment,” we must read Paragraph
6.f in connection with Paragraph 20, for, as noted, the former
is subject to the latter. Paragraph 20’s provisions on “dispute
resolution” reads in relevant part:
In the event [Sloan] asserts a claim for payment
of the Subcontract Sum or a portion thereof . . .
and in the event that [Shoemaker] in its sole,
exclusive and arbitrary discretion submits said .
. . Claim to [IOC] . . . for a decision or
determination, then all decisions and
determinations made by [IOC] or its
representative shall be binding upon [Sloan]
even though [Sloan] may not be a party thereto .
...
The decision or determination of [IOC] or its
representative making the first and/or original
decision shall be final and conclusive on
[Sloan] except to the extent that [Shoemaker]
may in its sole, exclusive and arbitrary
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discretion . . . appeal to other representatives of
[IOC] or commence a proceeding in Court or
arbitration or other dispute resolution forum
....
Then, in such event, [Sloan] agrees to be bound
to [Shoemaker] to the same extent [Shoemaker]
is bound to [IOC] by any final decisions of said
other representative of [IOC] or of a Court of
competent jurisdiction or by any final or interim
award issued in arbitration or by any final
decisions issued in any other dispute resolution
forum . . . .
This provision, also common in construction contracts,
provides a procedural mechanism for pass-through claims—a
process by which a general contractor may assert the claims
of its subcontractors against an owner. This mechanism is
known as a “liquidating agreement.” 10 See E. Elec. Corp. v.
10

“Liquidating agreements” in construction contracts are not
the same as “liquidated” in the liquidated damages sense (the
latter converting damages for a legal injury to a sum certain in
cash, see A.G. Cullen Const., Inc. v. State Sys. of Higher
Educ., 898 A.2d 1145, 1161-62 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006)
(noting that liquidated damages “denotes the sum a party to a
contract agrees to pay if he breaks some [contractual]
promise”)). Liquidating agreements are the mechanism by
which pass-through claims are asserted and they can,
depending on how they are drafted, “liquidate” damages (so
to speak) to the amount that the contractor has recovered from
the owner. They range in complexity and detail, depending
on the drafting. In any event, we do not suggest that a
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Shoemaker Const. Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 545, 560 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (acknowledging as a liquidating agreement language
that mirrors that in our case, namely, that the “Subcontractor
agrees to be bound to the Contractor to the same extent the
Contractor is bound to the Owner by any final decisions of
[Owner’s representative] or of a Court of competent
jurisdiction . . .[,] whether or not Subcontractor is a party to
such proceedings” (alterations in original)). One reason for
including this mechanism in subcontracts is to give the
subcontractor some means of redress against the owner in
situations where it would otherwise have none because it
lacks privity of contract with the owner. Thomas J. Kelleher,
Jr., Brian G. Corgan & William E. Dorris, Construction
Disputes: Practice Guide with Forms 904 (2d ed. 2002).
Sloan argues that Paragraph 20 does not apply to this
case because its only purpose is to resolve disputes between
the subcontractor and the general contractor over whether a
particular payment is owed and was not intended to resolve
disputes over final payment. We disagree.
Sloan’s narrow interpretation of Paragraph 20 is
unlikely. It seems strange that Sloan would have negotiated
for a liquidating provision that is limited in the way it
suggests, as it would be of little worth to Sloan: without the
ability to press a claim for final payment through Shoemaker
against IOC, Sloan would have no other remedy against IOC
in situations of IOC’s default. Moreover, the language of
Paragraph 6.f belies Sloan’s limited interpretation of
liquidating agreement is the same thing as a liquidated
damages provision.
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Paragraph 20. The former provision is explicit that if
Shoemaker pursues “its own claim for final payment,” that
claim “may or may not include claims of the Subcontractor.”
Shoemaker, Sloan argues, was not pursuing any of its
(Sloan’s) claims in any event. We do not accept that
Shoemaker was asserting its own claims wholly independent
of Sloan’s. As a practical matter, there is no meaningful
distinction between a suit brought to pay Shoemaker’s
invoices (which include those of its subcontractors) and a suit
brought nominally as a claim for its subcontractors’
payments. In any event, Shoemaker made a claim of $6.5
million against IOC, $5 million of which was for the
exclusive benefit of its subcontractors. It intends to pass all
funds received from the settlement through to its
subcontractors on a proportional basis.
In these
circumstances, that Shoemaker did not specifically name
Sloan in Shoemaker’s complaint against IOC is of no
consequence. We conclude that Paragraph 20 applies in this
case, and now turn to how this affects the nature and extent of
Sloan’s “remaining claim for final payment.”
Liquidating agreements that enable pass-through
claims, such as the one in the contract before us, can also
serve to limit the subcontractor’s damages to the amount the
contractor recovers from the owner. See Carl A. Calvert &
Carl F. Ingwalson, Jr., Pass Through Claims and Liquidation
Agreements, Constr. Lawyer, Oct. 1998, at 32, 33. Here, the
subcontract stated that “all decisions and determinations made
by [IOC]” in connection with a passed-through claim would
be “binding upon [Sloan] even though [Sloan] may not be a
party thereto.”
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This language in Paragraph 20 is repeated in the
second subparagraph of 6.f, the very provision that
establishes that Sloan has a “claim” in the event of IOC nonpayment. There, the parties agreed that nothing in that
Paragraph modifies Paragraph 20, “including[,] without
limitation, the provisions by which [Sloan] shall be bound to
the decision and/or determination of [IOC], its representatives
or a court or other fact finding dispute resolution forum[,]
concerning the claims of [Sloan].” In contract-speak, this is a
“super-override.” As Sloan is a sophisticated contracting
party, we cannot believe it did not understand the import of
this language that it agreed to twice. We thus conclude that
Paragraphs 20 and 6.f create a mechanism for passing through
Sloan’s remaining claims for final payment and peg Sloan’s
recovery to the amount that Shoemaker receives from IOC for
Sloan’s work.
We believe that this outcome is consistent with the
way in which the parties chose to allocate the risk of IOC
non-payment. As a general matter, industry custom places
the risk of an owner’s insolvency on the general contractor.
See, e.g., Thos. J. Dyer Co. v. Bishop Int’l Eng’g Co., 303
F.2d 655, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1962). But it is also industry
custom that “various legal and contractual provisions . . . are
used to reduce this [risk] to a minimum,” and that “express
condition[s] clearly showing that to be the intention of the
parties” may “transfer this normal credit risk incurred by the
general contractor from the general contractor to the
subcontractor.” Id. at 660-61. A way to do this is to put in
the contract a pay-if-paid provision, as it is “meant to shift the
risk of the owner’s nonpayment under the subcontract from
the contractor to the subcontractor.” Fixture Specialists, Inc.
v. Global Const., LLC, No. 07-5614, 2009 WL 904031, at *4
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(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2009) (quoting MidAm. Const. Mgmt. Co. v.
Mastec N. Am., Inc., 436 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2006)). Such
risk-shifting devices are easy to understand:
“[f]ew
contractors can financially absorb a major default in payment
by an owner in connection with a large construction project.
In the absence of an enforceable pay-if-paid clause, if the
owner defaults, the likely result would be an insolvent or
bankrupt contractor.” Construction Contracts Book, supra, at
158.
In this case, however, we believe the parties intended,
per the second part of Paragraph 6.f, to share the risk of
IOC’s non-payment. Shoemaker will bear its share of the loss
by distributing all of the settlement proceeds pro rata to its
subcontractors and keeping nothing for itself. But under the
District Court’s analysis, Shoemaker would bear all of the
loss and Sloan none. It would also force the other
subcontractors to shoulder a disproportionate amount of loss:
if Shoemaker is forced to pay Sloan the full balance, the
others might get nothing and certainly less than their pro rata
share. We do not believe Shoemaker and Sloan intended such
an outcome when they drafted the subcontract and we shall
not redistribute risk and loss in such a counterintuitive way
absent clear language to that effect. As such, Sloan must bear
its share of IOC’s failure to pay by accepting only a pro rata
share of the recovery by Shoemaker rather than the full
balance on its subcontract. 11

11

Sloan complains that the situation is contrary to
Pennsylvania’s public policy because, to procure the
subcontract, it was required to waive its mechanic’s lien
(which is a legal interest in the property held by those who
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In addition, we do not favor an interpretation that
discourages contractors from vigorously pursuing owners for
sums due to subcontractors. Shoemaker purportedly spent
over $3 million in order to get back a $1 million settlement,
of which we understand only $300,000 has been paid. It has
stated that it will pass through all sums recovered subject to
the parties sharing pro rata in all expenses and costs. Were
we to interpret the subcontract to give Sloan the entire
balance on the subcontract, contractors in the future would be
very reluctant to expend such substantial costs for the
exclusive benefit of their subcontractors.
Finally, our interpretation is consistent with the
industry custom and usage surrounding liquidating
agreements, which is to “provide a means to simplify the
pursuit of pass through claims while preserving working
relationships and reducing costs,” and the industry’s
understanding that “the major reason for negotiating
liquidation agreements is to bring the claim against the
provide unpaid labor or materials to build or improve the
property, see Halowich v. Amminiti, 154 A.2d 406, 407 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1959)), and was given the surety bond instead. It
cites to state law that conditions the validity of a mechanic’s
lien waiver on posting a surety bond. 49 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 1401(a)(2)(ii) (West 2007). However, this amendment to
Pennsylvania law came into effect after Sloan bid for and
accepted the subcontract. Without relying on that policy,
Sloan freely accepted the tradeoff between a mechanic’s lien
and a surety bond. In this context, we do not believe that
enforcing the contract as written and intended by the parties is
contrary to public policy.
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responsible party”—here the owner, IOC.
Ingwalson, supra, at 37.

Calvert &

As Shoemaker’s suit against IOC qualified as a “passthrough” claim of all its subcontractors, and IOC’s decision to
settle was a qualifying “determination” by it (the outcome of
which now binds Sloan), Sloan’s claim against Shoemaker is
limited to its pro rata share of the settlement proceeds. 12
B.

Legal fees

Liberty Mutual also argues that it was entitled to
deduct (or offset) from Sloan’s recovery the latter’s share of
Shoemaker’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in
the suit against IOC. Before we deal with the merits of this
issue, we note that Sloan cross-appeals the District Court’s
decision to allow Liberty Mutual’s offset claims to proceed,
arguing they were not raised within 45 days of Sloan’s initial
claim. Thus we deal with the cross-appeal at the outset.
The bond required that Liberty Mutual raise all
disputes with Sloan’s claim within 45 days. As noted,
Liberty Mutual generally denied Sloan’s entire claim within
35 days, but rather than explaining the various offsets it
planned to claim, it simply reserved its rights and defenses.
Sloan argued to the District Court that Liberty Mutual was
12

Because we decide on the basis of the parties’ express
agreement that Sloan is entitled only to its pro rata share of
the settlement amount, we need not determine whether the
Pennsylvania Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act, 73
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 507 (West 2006), provides an additional basis
for imposing a pay-if-paid condition on the subcontract.
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required to state the exact amount it disputed, including the
offsets for “time and materials provided,” “lump sum
proposals performed,” and legal fees. The District Court
rejected that argument and held that Liberty Mutual’s
response met its obligations under Paragraph 6.1 of the
bond. 13 We agree.
Sloan relies on three cases to support its waiver
argument. The first is National Union Fire Insurance Co. v.
Bramble, Inc., 879 A.2d 101 (Md. 2005). But there the surety
did not refute the subcontractor’s claim at all; it merely
acknowledged receipt of the subcontractor’s letter and
requested proof of the claim. The other two cases relate
tenuously at best, as neither is precedential. See J.C. Gibson
Plastering Co. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 521 F. Supp. 2d 1326
(M.D. Fla. 2007) (vacated with instructions that it shall not be
cited or serve as precedent and modified to make exception
for facts not reasonably available in the 45-day period); Casey
Indus., Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Co., No. 1:06cv249, 2006 WL
3299932 (E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2006) (unpublished decision
holding that the surety was precluded from developing new
bases for dispute outside the 45-day period).
In any event, it is clear to us that Sloan’s argument
runs contrary to standard industry practice. The Surety &
Fidelity Association of America explains in its amicus brief
that in recent revisions of the standard payment bond form,
13

Paragraph 6.1 required Liberty Mutual to answer Sloan
within 45 days of its receipt of Sloan’s claim, stating, inter
alia, the bases for challenging any disputed amounts of that
claim.
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the industry chose language to clarify that Paragraph 6 does
not put sureties at risk of waiving claims to specific offsets.
Brief for Surety & Fidelity Assoc. of Am. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., Nos. 101725 & 10-1765, at 15-17. The revised form clarifies that a
surety’s failure to discharge obligations under Paragraphs 6.1
or 6.2 “shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of
defenses.”
Once again, the consequences of Sloan’s interpretation
are untenable. Its construction would essentially require a
surety to state every reason or contention it has or may later
have in connection with a general denial of the claim lest it be
precluded from asserting those defenses in the future. 14 We
believe that Liberty Mutual’s response to Sloan met the
requirements of the bond as those requirements were
understood in the industry at the time of Liberty Mutual’s
response, and we thus conclude that it did not breach the
surety bond contract.
Turning now to the merits, Paragraph 20 of the
subcontract states that “[i]f [Sloan]’s claims are prosecuted or
defended by [Shoemaker] against [IOC] or others, then
[Sloan] agrees . . . to pay or reimburse [Shoemaker] for all
expenses and costs, if any, incurred in connection therewith.”
As discussed, we believe Paragraph 20 applies to this case
and Shoemaker asserted a pass-through claim on behalf of
14

Moreover, the bond required only a barebones demand for
payment of a sum certain without any backup documentation.
It makes little sense, then, to require the surety to reply with a
detailed and exhaustive accounting.
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Sloan. Thus, the only remaining question is whether the term
“expenses and costs” includes attorneys’ fees in addition to
other litigation-related expenses and costs. We believe that it
does.
Sloan contends that if the parties had intended to
provide for attorneys’ fees in Paragraph 20, they would have
stated so explicitly. Indeed, the “settled” law of Pennsylvania
is that “attorneys[’] fees are recoverable from an adverse
party to a cause only when provided for by statute, or when
clearly agreed to by the parties.” Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v.
Phila. Transp. Co., 173 A.2d 109, 113 (Pa. 1961). The latter
is our case; the parties were sufficiently explicit that
attorneys’ fees and litigation costs were within the purview of
the contract. The most natural and likely meaning of
“expenses and costs” in a paragraph discussing procedural
mechanisms for lawsuits and other dispute resolution
proceedings is that the term includes attorneys’ fees and not
simply court and mediation costs.
See Wrenfield
Homeowners Ass’n v. DeYoung, 600 A.2d 960 (Pa. 1991)
(interpreting contractual agreement to pay the “costs of
collecti[ng]” home-owner association assessments as
including attorneys’ fees, given the broadness of that phrase
and the reasonableness of that interpretation in context);
Burrage v. Cnty. of Bristol, 210 Mass. 299, 300 (1911)
(noting the “word ‘expenses’ [is] broad enough to include
counsel fees” and whether it does depends on the context). 15

15

Our holding is limited to Liberty Mutual’s right to expenses
and costs (including attorneys’ fees) from Shoemaker’s case
against IOC. Because Liberty Mutual’s claim for attorneys’
fees was dismissed at summary judgment, without discovery
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*
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For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the
District Court’s Final Judgment to the extent that it granted
summary judgment to Sloan on (1) its interpretation of the
subcontract and (2) Liberty Mutual’s claim for the
proportional offset against Sloan of legal fees Shoemaker
incurred in its suit again IOC; we affirm the Court’s denial of
Sloan’s waiver claim (the subject of Sloan’s cross-appeal in
this case); and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. Though the parties do not contest the stipulated
amounts of the offsets in the Final Judgment, we leave to the
District Court whether on remand they may argue those other
offsets.

regarding the amounts and reasonableness of those fees, we
leave it to Liberty Mutual to prove that on remand. However,
because we limit Sloan’s claim to its pro rata share of the
amount recovered so far, $300,000, we believe it reasonable
for Liberty Mutual to offset Sloan’s claim, at most, by the
appropriate pro rata share of that $300,000.
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